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Comment
Enforcement Powers Under The Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969: Does Procedural Due
Process Apply in the Coal Fields?
On November 20, 1968, 78 miners working the midnight shift at
Consolidation Coal Co.'s No. 9 mine near Farmington, W. Va., were
killed by an explosion.' In all, 309 miners throughout the country
were killed on the job that year. Since the odds in 1968 were approximately 500 to 1 that a miner would lose his life while working, coal
mining was easily the nation's most hazardous occupation.2 The
Farmington disaster had a catalytic effect on proposed coal mine
safety and health reform legislation and greatly influenced the passage of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.1
The Secretary of Interior (Secretary) is charged with administration and enforcement of the Act.4 He is authorized to promulgate
and revise mandatory safety standards,5 and his representatives
(inspectors) are required to conduct frequent inspections in the coal
mines to insure compliance with those standards. The inspectors
1.

HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, FEDERAL COAL MINE

HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT,

S. REP. No. 91-411, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969) [along with H.R.

REP. No. 91-563 and H.R. REP. No. 91-761, this will hereafter be cited as LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY].

Id.
3. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1970) [hereafter referred to as the Act]. The Act applies to all
coal mines the products of which enter or affect interstate commerce, the operators of such
mines and the miners working therein. Id. § 803.
4. The Secretary was to exercise his enforcement function through the Bureau of Mines.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 635. That function was delegated to the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration [hereinafter cited as MESA], 38 Fed. Reg. 18,695-96
(1973).
5. 30 U.S.C. § 811(a) (1970).
6. Inspectors are required to completely inspect all mines at least four times a year. The
2.

inspections are to be conducted for the purposes, inter alia, of determining whether there is
compliance with the mandatory standards and enforcement actions taken pursuant to the
Act, and to determine whether an imminent danger exists. Inspections are to be conducted

without advance notice. Id. § 813(a). Inspectors are authorized to enter into all coal mines
without a warrant. Id. § 813(b) (held constitutional in Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v.
Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973). Inspectors are also required to conduct at least
one weekly spot inspection of all or part of any mine which liberates excessive quantities of
methane, one in which an ignition or explosion which caused death or serious injury has
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are provided with a comprehensive scheme of enforcement powers
to insure strict compliance with the mandatory standards and are
empowered, where necessary, to take immediate summary action to
protect the miners' lives.7 Each of the enforcement provisions gives
an inspector the discretion and ultimate authority to order the withdrawal of all persons from a mine or designated part thereof. The
Act does not require or provide for notice or a prior hearing before
such an order is issued, but a mine operator (operator) may apply
for administrative review by the Secretary after an order has been
issued.8 The issuance of a withdrawal order has several significant
effects. First, it requires the immediate cessation of all production
activities until the inspector or the Secretary determines that the
cause for its issuance has been abated,' i.e., it constitutes an immediate and direct temporary interference with the operator's property. If a violation of a mandatory standard is found and described
in the order, the Secretary will then assess a civil penalty against
the mine operator. ° If the violation is the result of the operator's
willful or knowing neglect, the operator may be criminally prosecuted." Furthermore, if miners are idled because of the issuance of
the order, the operator is required to compensate such miners for at
least part, if not all, of the time lost due to the order. 2
This comment considers whether the enforcement and hearing
provisions of the Act, as interpreted and applied by the Secretary,
meet the requirements of due process. That is, does the issuance of
a withdrawal order without notice and a prior hearing deny a coal
mine operator his property without due process of law. In undertaking this inquiry, the withdrawal order and hearing provisions are
first described, followed by a review of the administrative and court
decisions interpreting these provisions. A brief survey of the present
occurred during the preceding five years, or a mine where an especially hazardous condition
exists. 30 U.S.C. § 813(i) (1970).
7. 30 U.S.C. §§ 814(a)-(c) (1970). The details of these enforcement provisions will be
considered infra.
8. Id. § 815(a).
9. Id. §§ 814(g), 815(b).
10. Id. § 819(a). The civil penalty is assessed only after the operator has been given notice
and an opportunity for a hearing pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
554 (1970); 30 U.S.C. § 819(a)(3) (1970).
11. 30 U.S.C. §§ 819(b), (c) (1970).
12. Id. § 820(a). Miners idled by an order issued pursuant to §§ 814(a) or (b) are entitled
to compensation for the balance of that shift and for four hours of the next shift or until the
termination of the order whichever occurs first. Miners idled by an order under § 814(c) are
entitled to compensation for idle time up to one week.
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status of due process is considered in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions such as Fuentes v. Shevin'3 and Mitchell v. W T. Grant
Co.,' 4 which generally condemned pre-notice, pre-hearing government seizures as deprivations of private property, at least where
strict control over such power is lacking.
THE ACT'S PROVISIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT, NOTICE AND HEARING

Section 104 of the Act 5 provides the inspector with three separate
enforcement tools. Under subsection (a)," the inspector is required
to immediately issue an order withdrawing all non-abatement personnel from an endangered area whenever he finds that an imminent danger exists. "Imminent danger" is defined as "the existence
of any condition or practice in a coal mine which could reasonably
be expected to cause death or serious physical harm before such
condition or practice can be abated."' 7 Subsection (b)' 8 provides
that, if the inspector finds a violation of the mandatory safety standards that does not constitute an imminent danger, he must issue
a notice of violation and set a reasonable time for abatement. 9 If
the violation is not abated in the time set and there is no reason to
extend such time, the inspector must thereafter issue an order withdrawing all non-abatement personnel until the violation is abated.
Subsection (c) 0 applies if the inspector finds a violation of any of
the mandatory standards which does not constitute an imminent
danger but does constitute a significant safety hazard caused by the
13. 407 U.S. 67, reh. denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
14. 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
15. 30 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
16. Id. § 814(a), provides in pertinent part:
If, upon any inspection of a coal mine, an . . .[inspector] finds that an imminent
danger exists, . . . [he] shall determine the area throughout which such danger exists,
and thereupon shall issue forthwith an order requiring the operator . . .to cause
immediately all persons . . . to be withdrawn from, and to be prohibited from entering, such area until an . . . [inspector] determines that such imminent danger no
longer exists.
Excepted from the withdrawal order provisions of §§ 104(a)-(c) are: (1) persons deemed
necessary to abate the condition; (2) any public official whose duties require his presence;
(3) a representative of the miners qualified to be in such an area; and (4) any consultant to
the above. Id. § 814(d).
17. Id. § 802(j).
18. Id. § 814(b).
19. No criteria for determining a reasonable time for abatement are provided in the Act.
20. 30 U.S.C. § 814(c) (1970).
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operator's "unwarrantable failure."'" Such findings are included in
the notice of violation. If a second unwarrantable failure violation
is found during the same inspection, or during a subsequent inspection within ninety days, the inspector must immediately issue an
order withdrawing all non-abatement personnel until the violation
is abated. Once a withdrawal order has been issued under subsection (c), the inspector must continue to issue a withdrawal order
when he finds any similar 22 violation until an inspection 23 discloses
the lack of such violations. In addition, several of the mandatory
safety standards require the operator to withdraw all nonabatement personnel on his own initiative. The operator is required
to conduct a number of pre-shift, 24 on-shift,2 5 and weekly 2 inspections of all active working areas." If he finds a violation of the safety
standards, a hazardous condition, or an imminent danger, he is
required to post a "DANGER" sign at all access ways to the area
and to withdraw all non-abatement personnel until the condition is
eliminated. 28 The operator is also required to make frequent examinations for methane gas29 and to withdraw all miners when 1.5 vol3
ume per centum of methane is detected. 1
Where any violation of the mandatory standards is found, the Act
requires the Secretary to assess a civil penalty on the operator of the
21. "Unwarrantable failure" is not defined in the Act, but it is defined in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1030 as:
[T]he failure of an operator to abate a violation he knew or should have known
existed, or the failure to abate a violation because of a lack of due diligence, or because
of indifference or lack of reasonable care, on the operator's part.
22. The word "similar" is not defined in the Act or the legislative history. In Eastern
18,706, at 22,598,
Associated Coal Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE
22,603 (1974), it was defined as requiring the common characteristics of § 104(c)(1), i.e., that
the violation (1) does not constitute an imminent danger; (2) does cause a significant health
or safety hazard; and (3) is caused by the operator's unwarrantable failure.
23. For the purposes of § 104(c)(2), the term "inspection" was held to mean a complete
inspection of the entire mine, even though that inspection may take as long as three months
to complete. Id. at 22,604 n.10.
24. 30 U.S.C. § 863(d) (1970). See also 30 C.F.R. § 75.303 (1973).
25. 30 U.S.C. § 863(e) (1970). See also 30 C.F.R. § 75.304 (1973).
26. 30 U.S.C. § 863(f) (1970). See also 30 C.F.R. § 75.305 (1973).
27. "Active workings" is defined as "any place in a coal mine where miners are normally
required to work or travel." 30 U.S.C. § 878(g)(4) (1970).
* 28. 30 U.S.C. §§ 863(d)-(f) (1970). See also 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.303-.305 (1973).
29. Methane gas is a highly explosive gas commonly liberated from the coal seam during
the mining process. Its explosive range is 5-15 volume per centum. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 58-59.
30. 30 U.S.C. § 863(h) (1970). See also 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.307-.310 (1973).
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mine in an amount up to $10,000 for each violation.3 ' In determining
the amount of the penalty, the Secretary must consider the operator's history of previous violations, the size of the operator's business, the operator's negligence, the effect of the penalty on the operator's continued operations, and the operator's good faith in rapidly
abating the violation after it is found.3" The Act also imposes criminal sanctions against an operator who wilfully violates any standard
or knowingly violates any order issued under section 104.11
The Act requires that all notices and orders issued pursuant to
section 104 contain a detailed description of the condition or practice constituting an imminent danger or a violation of the mandatory standards, the mandatory standard violated, and the area of
the mine affected.14 All notices and orders must be in writing and
must be immediately served on the operator or his agent.35
The operator or a representative of the miners is entitled to obtain
an administrative review of any order issued pursuant to section 104
or a notice issued pursuant to section 104(b) by filing an application
for review within thirty days after the issuance of such notice or
order.3 6 The filing of an application does not, however, stay the
effect of the notice or order,37 but pending review, the applicant may
obtain temporary relief from an order issued pursuant to sections
104(b) or (c).38 After the Secretary has issued his final order on
review, an aggrieved party may seek review by an appropriate
3
United States circuit court of appeals. 1
THE ENFORCEMENT, NOTICE AND HEARING PROVISIONS APPLIED

More than forty-five hundred imminent danger orders and sixty31. 30 U.S.C. § 819(a)(1) (1970).
32. Id.
33. Id. § 819(b), (c).
34. Id. § 814(e).
35. Id. § 814(f).
36. Id. § 815(a)(1). The hearings are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act; id.
§ 815(a)(2). The Secretary has delegated his review authority to the Office of Hearings and
Appeals; 43 C.F.R. § 4.1 (1973). The evidence is heard by an administrative law judge
pursuant to special departmental regulations; id. §§ 4.580-.595. The Board of Mine Operations Appeals has general review authority of proceedings under the Act, and it is empowered
to issue the final order of the Secretary; id. §§ 4.1(4), 4.500, 4.605.
37. 30 U.S.C. § 815(a)(1) (1970).
38. Id. § 815(d).
39. Id. § 816. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to judicial review.
See, e.g., Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 491 F.2d
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one hundred non-imminent danger and unwarrantable failure orders were issued during the first three years of the Act's existence. 0
The reason for the seemingly large number of withdrawal orders is
not at all clear, but there are two factors which are probably significant in contributing to their overabundance: the inherently dangerous nature of coal mining coupled with the difficulty in maintaining
the status quo in a coal mine; and the fact that specific guidelines
given to inspectors in their training call for the issuance of withdrawal orders whenever certain conditions or practices are found.4'
277 (4th Cir. 1974) (noting judicial review as appropriate); Pittston Co. v. Board of Mine
Operations Appeals, 460 F.2d 1189 (4th Cir. 1972) (denying interlocutory judicial review).
40. These statistics were obtained from the Assistant Director, Coal Mine Health and
Safety, U.S. Department of Interior, and annual reports on the Act. CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY
& HEALTH GUIDE 1973-1974 Developments 8,899, at 7,757-60; 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY
& HEALTH GUIDE
9,497, at 8,842 (1974). By comparison, only two imminent danger order
proceedings are reported under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 662(a)
(1973 Supp.), for the same period. See Dye Constr. Co., 1971-1973 OSHD 15,720, at 21,015
(D. Colo. 1973); A.G. Pinkston Co., 1971-1973 OSHD
15,498, at 20,781 (E.D. Va. 1972).
41. The inspectors are given two manuals during their training: The United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines Coal Mine Safety Inspection Manual for Underground
Mines (Sept. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Inspection Manual], and The United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines Health and Safety Manual for Orders, Notices and Report
Writing [hereinafter cited as Report Manual]. The Report Manual, supra at 1, specifies that
imminent danger orders may be issued for violations of the mandatory standards or naturally
caused conditions. The Inspection Manual calls for the issuance of imminent danger orders
in several specific instances. The finding of an accumulation of "inadequately inerted" coal
dust, which cannot be cleaned up in less than thirty minutes, is cause for issuance of an
imminent danger order, Inspection Manual, supra at § 75.400. This rule has been declared
invalid in a number of administrative decisions. See, e.g., Kings Station Coal Corp. cases at
Docket Nos. VINC 73-239 (1973), appeal filed, IBMA 74-46 (1973); VINC 73-194 (1973),
appealfiled, IBMA 74-45 (1973); VINC 73-112 (1973), appealfiled, IBMA 74-44 (1973); VINC
73-107 (1973), appeal filed, IBMA 74-43 (1973); and VINC 73-19 (1973), appealfiled, IBMA
74-42 (1973).
Cause for issuance of an imminent danger order is mandated by the Inspection Manual,
supra at § 75.606, where electrical cables are run over by any type of mobile equipment. This
rule was held invalid in Kings Station Coal Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH
GUIDE
18,664, at 22,567 (1974); Quarto Mining Co., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH
GUIDE 18,075, at 22,295 (1974).
The Report Manual, supra at 7, had previously called for issuance of imminent danger
orders where it was necessary for MESA to maintain control of a mine or affected area until
an investigation or until recovery operations were completed after an accident or disaster.
This provision was changed on August 7, 1974, apparently in response to two decisions holding
enforcement action in accordance with this instruction improper. The manual now provides
for such action to be taken under 30 U.S.C. §§ 813(e).(f) (1970). See Eastern Associated Coal
Corp., Docket No. HOPE 73-663 (1974), appeal filed, IBMA, 74-64; and U.S. Steel Corp.,
Docket No. BARB73-372-P (1974).
In Eastern Associated Coal Corp., Docket No. MORG 74-50, at 5 (1974), an inspector
testified that, as a matter of policy, inspectors are instructed to issue a § 104(b) order if
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The due process issue concerning the Act has never been raised
or decided by the Board of Mine Operations Appeals (Board) or the
courts.42 When an order or a 104(b) notice is issued, an operator may
apply for review and request an expedited hearing which, if granted,
should take place no more than eight days after the application and
request are filed.43 If a 104(b) or (c) order is issued, the operator may
apply for a stay, but, of course, the order remains effective until the
obtainment of the stay, which could take several days and could
require a hearing itself. If a 104(a) order is issued, the operator's only
recourse is to request an expedited hearing.
At least in theory, an operator can obtain a prior hearing in the
case of a 104(b) or (c) order by seeking a review of the underlying
notice." As a practical matter, however, in the case of a 104(b)
certain types of violations are not abated by the time the inspector is ready to leave the area.
See also U.S. Steel Corp., Docket No. DENV 72-46 (1973); Kings Station Coal Corp., Docket
No. VINC 73-240 (1973).
On May 4, 1972, the Department of Interior Associate Solicitor, Mine Health and Safety,
wrote a memorandum advising the Acting Deputy Director of Mine Health and Safety that
his instruction to inspectors to use § 104(c) notices and orders for all violations of the roof
control regulations was not in conformance with the statutory requirements.
42. The constitutionality of § 104(b) was challenged on due process grounds in Lucas v.
Morton, 358 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Pa. 1973). Lucas, a coal mine operator who had been issued
a § 104(b) notice, sought an injunction against the issuance of a § 104(b) order on the
expiration of the time given for abatement, claiming that § 104(b) permitted an inspector to
shut down a coal mine and cause severe financial harm before the operator had an opportunity for a hearing on the notice of violation. Id. at 902. The court noted that the administrative
procedures provided for an expedited hearing but that a stay of the notice could not be
obtained during the pendency of the hearing. Id. at 903.
In denying injunctive relief, the court relied on Reliable Coal Corp., 1971-1973 OSHD
15,368, at 20,515, 20,519 (1971), where the Board had stated that meaningful administrative
review of a notice would have to take place within the time set for abatement and that the
Office of Hearings and Appeals was prepared to provide an expedited hearing and ruling to
avoid the improper issuance of a subsequent order. The court did note that undue delay in
the prosecution of a review proceeding would be prejudicial to the operator and would do
violence to the basic requirements of due process. The court upheld the constitutionality of
§ 104(b) on the facts presented because the inspector could, in his discretion, extend the time
for abatement under § 104(g), 30 U.S.C. § 814(g) (1970), or the Board could issue a stay under
§ 105(d) if an order was issued and there was the likelihood that the result of the review would
be favorable to the operator. 358 F. Supp. at 903-05.
The court did acknowledge that the Act might seem to require the operator to choose
between abating the alleged violation before the hearing is held or subject himself to an order
if his application was unsuccessful. "Were such procedures mandated by the Act, we would
indeed face serious claims of deprival of due process." Id. at 903.
43. 43 C.F.R. § 4.514 (1973).
44. While the Act does not specifically provide for review of § 104(c) notices, the Board
has never denied review of such notices when it has been sought. Cf. Zeigler Coal Co., 3 CCH
EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE
19,131, at 22,852, 22,853 (1974), decided after this
comment was written, held that a section 104(c)(1) notice by itself is not subject to review.
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notice, the operator may not initially dispute the existence of the
violation or the time set for abatement (which may be as short as a
half-hour), 4 but he may subsequently take issue with the inspector's refusal to extend the time for abatement because of subsequent
occurrences. In such a situation, the only available opportunity to
be heard is in a post-order hearing.
Similarly, in the application of section 104(c), where an order can
be issued during the same inspection in which the underlying notice
was issued, it may be a practical impossibility to obtain a review of
the notice before the issuance of the order.
In most instances, the issuance of an order puts the operator in a
dilemma if he feels the order is unjustified. He can stand on his
rights, demand an expedited hearing, and leave his mine closed
until a decision is finally rendered after the hearing, if the order is
for an alleged imminent danger; or until a stay is obtained, if the
order is issued pursuant to section 104(b) or (c). Of course in doing
so, he is required to compensate the miners idled by the order for
at least part of their lost time,4" and even if the order is vacated on
review, he has no recourse against the inspector or the government
for the economic losses which he has suffered. 7 On the other hand,
he can seek to minimize his economic losses by complying with the
inspector's wishes and subsequently filing for review as a matter of
principle. If an operator does not request an expedited hearing, the
case usually will not be heard until six months to a year after the
48
order is terminated.
45. Notices and orders, however, are generally issued orally at the scene and then written
and served on the operator on the surface after the shift. See Eastern Associated Coal Corp.,
1971-1973 OSHD 16,187, at 21,160-61 (1973).
46. The Board has held that subsequent vacation of an order does not divest the miners
of their right to compensation. Rushton Mining Co., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEATH
18,077, at 22,297 (1974); CF&I Steel Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH
GUIDE
GUIDE
17,962, at 22,241 (1974). This reasoning may also apply to time lost due to an order
issued and then stayed pending decision, even though the order is subsequently vacated.
47. The Act provides no recourse for the operator who has been issued an improper order.
The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970), exempts the government from
liability for discretionary acts of its employees pursuant to a statute or regulation. Government employees are also protected from such liability. Scherer v. Morrow, 401 F.2d 204 (7th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1084 (1969).
48. The operator has 30 days in which to file his application, and the statutory parties,
the Secretary and a representative of the miners, 30 U.S.C. § 815(a)(1) (1970), have 30 days
in which to file an answer.A general survey of the review decisions indicates that the cases
are not heard for at least six months and often the decisions are not issued for an additional
three to six months due to the fact that the Administrative Procedure Act requires that the
parties be given an opportunity to file written proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law
and briefs after the hearing. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1970); 43 C.F.R. § 4.592 (1973).
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The Board has, held that even terminated orders are reviewable
because of the need "to establish guidelines as to the proper basis
for the issuance of an order of withdrawal and [because such guidelines] would help to protect all operators from the adverse effects
of improperly issued orders."' 9 The establishment of strict guidelines seems particularly important where due process questions are
raised.50 The substantive meaning of imminent danger has been
dealt with by the Board in two cases reviewing such terminated
orders. In the first, EasternAssociated Coal Corp.,5 ' the Board held
that an imminent danger exists whenever the condition or practice
is such that it could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious
harm "if normal mining operations were permitted to proceed in the
area before the dangerous condition [was] eliminated."52 Commenting on the particular facts of this case, the Board added that:
(1) the condition could not be divorced from the "normal work
activity"; (2) prior voluntary action by the operator was praiseworthy, but that such action did not eliminate the "imminence" of the
hazard; (3) the fact that the abatement period was short did not
invalidate a finding of imminent danger; (4) time for abatement
alone was not a proper consideration; and (5) no review of whether
the inspector used the appropriate enforcement tool would be considered.53
49. Zeigler Coal Corp., 1971-1973 OSHD 15,371, at 20,524 (1971). This reasoning is
supported by Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
50. One of the key criteria in determining the constitutionality of statutes such as the Act
is the existence of strict controls over the exercise of the powers granted. See discussion of
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) and Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S.Ct. 1895 (1974)
in text accompanying notes 91-95 infra.
51. 1971-1973 OSHD 16,187, at 21,159 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Eastern Associated Coal
Corp. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 491 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1974). The condition
cited in the inspector's order was as follows:
There is an excessive accumulation of loose coal and rock on the floor of the No. 4
Entry, 8 feet inby, 16 left section loading point extending for a distance of 25 feet. The
vertical clearance is restricted to 54 inches. The shuttle cars have rubbed the roof and
dislodged two roof-bolt[s] which are hanging down 6 inches at the brow of the boom
hole. This is a hazard to the shuttle car operators.
1971-1973 OSHD 16,187, at 21,161 (1973).
At the time the condition was observed, the section crew had just arrived on the section
and no mining activity was taking place. The shuttle car sitting on the pile of rock and coal
was unmanned. Eastern's section foreman had also observed the condition and had ordered
the shuttle car removed and the condition corrected. The inspector orally issued the order
and later reduced it to writing on the surface of the mine and thereupon served it on the
operator. The condition was abated in about an hour. Id. at 21,160-61.
52. Id. at 21,161.
53. Id. at 21,161-62. The dissent, however, vigorously maintained that: (1) the majority's
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The Board dealt with this issue a second time in Freeman Coal
Mining Corp.54 In its analysis, the Board stated that the term "reasonably," as applied in the definition of imminent danger, rendered
the test of imminence objective, and thus the inspector's subjective
opinion was not necessarily binding.5 The proper standard, it announced, is whether the condition is
of a nature that would induce a reasonable man to estimate
that if normal operations designed to extract coal in the disputed area proceeded, it is at least just as probable as not that
the feared accident
or disaster would occur before elimination
5
of the danger. 1
The Board also added that the existence of an imminent danger
must be determined on a case by case basis. 7
Since Eastern and Freeman, the Board has abstained from any
further consideration of the meaning of "imminent danger," and it
interpretation was contrary to the generally accepted meaning of the word "imminent"; (2)
its interpretation was contrary to the legislative history of the imminent danger concept; (3)
the time for abatement is a vital consideration in determining the existence of an imminent
danger; (4) the Board should have decided the issue of whether the inspector chose the proper
enforcement tool; and (5) the majority's use of the new undefined term "normal mining"
operations would create confusion throughout the industry. Id. at 21,162-64. The dissent
specifically noted that the Board, as final review authority for the Department, should not
be bound by the subjective opinion of an inspector and emphasized that:
A principal function of any governmental administrative review tribunal . . . is to
counteract the actions of administrative personnel which do not conform to a statutory
standard or which are not supported by the facts.
Id. at 21,163.
54. 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE
16,567, at 21,391, aff'd sub nom.
Freeman Coal Mining Corp. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, F.2d (7th
Cir. 1974). The condition described in the order was as follows:
The main belt from the dump on the bottom of the tailpiece at 1,004 ft. tag north
and the main east belt from No.1 drive to the 7 north a distance of 4,569 ft. tag, and
the 7 north belt was very black with float coal dust.
Id. at 16,567, at 21,391. The section was covered for 24 hours.
55. Id. at 21,395.
56. Id. The Board also said that in each case the question was:
Would a reasonable man, given a qualified inspector's education and experience,
conclude that the facts indicate an impending accident or disaster, threatening to kill
or to cause serious physical harm, likely to occur at any moment, but not necessarily
immediately?
Id.
Compare the requirement of a finding of a "presently existing threat to the employees'
safety" supported by "ascertainable, objective evidence" of an abnormally dangerous work
condition to uphold a finding of imminent danger in Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S.
368, 386-87 (1974).
57. 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE 16,567, at 21,395.
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has based all its subsequent decisions on whether an applicant has
met his burden of proof.5" A close examination of the subsequent
decisions indicates the lack of any apparent consistency in the determination of imminent danger on review by the administrative
law judges. In one line of cases, imminent danger orders based on
the finding of accumulations of loose coal and coal dust were vacated,5" yet in a second series of cases imminent danger orders based
on seemingly identical facts were affirmed." Similarly, an imminent
danger order based on shuttle cars running over energized electrical
cables was vacated in one case, 1 while2 such an order was affirmed
6
in another instance with similar facts.
In determining a reasonable time for abatement, the Board has
stated that an inspector should consider the availability of necessary equipment, the degree of danger caused by the violation, and
the difficulty of such abatement." Where a significant hazard exists
because of a violation, abatement should be required as soon as
possible; however, enforcement action under section 104(a) is the
responsibility of the inspector, and his failure to take such action is
not an appropriate issue on review. The Board has also declared that
to some extent the distinction between a 104(a) order and a 104(b)
notice requiring prompt abatement is largely formal, since both
require prompt abatement when a significant hazard is found.64 In
the line of cases dealing with section 104(c),15 the Board adopted a
58. See, e.g., Old Ben Coal Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE 18,299,
at 22,409 (1974); Old Ben Coal Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE 18,298,
at 22,408 (1974); Old Ben Coal Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE 18,297,
at 22,407 (1974); Old Ben Coal Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE 18,227,
at 22,368 (1974); Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE
18,078, at 22,298 (1974); Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY &
HEALTH GUIDE 18,076, at 22,296 (1974); Quarto Mining Co., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY &
18,075, at 22,295 (1974); U.S. Steel Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY &
HEALTH GUIDE
17,551, at 21,299 (1974), where the Board held that the applicant had met
HEALTH GUIDE
its burden of proof.
59. See note 41 supra.
60. See cases cited note 58 supra.
61. Kings Station Coal Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE 18,664, at
22,567 (1974); Quarto Mining Co., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE 18,075, at
22,295 (1974).
17,551, at 21,999
62. U.S. Steel Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE
(1974).
15,367, at 20,501, 20,509 (1970).
63. Freeman Coal Mining Corp., 1971-1973 OSHD
64. Id.
65. The requisite elements for a § 104(c) notice or order are a lack of imminent danger, a
violation which causes a significant hazard, and a condition which is caused by the operator's
unwarrantable failure.
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reasonable man standard in determining unwarrantable failure,"6
and it defined a significant hazard as one which poses a serious risk
of death or serious injury short of imminent danger. 7
The Act also provides for an administrative proceeding for the
assessment of a civil penalty for each violation cited in a notice or
order. Where possible, the penalty and review proceedings may be
consolidated." The validity of a withdrawal order may not be challenged in a penalty proceeding, 9 but where an order has been vacated in a review proceeding, the administrative law judge may, in
his discretion, consider the economic loss caused by the invalid
order in determining the amount of the penalty." Where a penalty
proceeding involves an order, the fact that the violation was cited
in an order is a necessary consideration in determining the amount
of the penalty.'
SOME INITIAL COMMENTS

At this point it is appropriate to summarize and comment on the
guidelines established by the Board's interpretations of sections
66. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE 18,706,
at 22,604 (1974).
67. Id. at 22,602.
68. 30 U.S.C. § 819(a)(3) (1970).
69. See, e.g., Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUmIE
18,901, at 22,707 (1974).
70. The consideration of economic loss is limited to an assessment arising out of the
vacated order; a claim of such loss must be affirmatively pleaded; there is no statutory right
to a dollar-for-dollar offset; and the administrative law judge can give whatever weight he
deems appropriate to such losses. North Am. Coal Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY &
HEALTH GUIDE

17,658, at 22,058, 22,064-65 (1974).

71. By definition a violation which causes an imminent danger should be deemed very
serious. See Spring Branch Coal Co., 1971-1973 OSHD
16,240, at 21,194 (1973); Eastern
Associated Coal Corp., 1971-1973 OSHD 15,388, at 20,564 (1972). The issuance of a § 104(b)
order should indicate a lack of good faith. The finding of unwarrantable failure and a signifi-

cant hazard under § 104(c) should indicate more than ordinary negligence and seriousness,
as well as a significant history of previous violations. See Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 3
CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE 18,706, at 22,602-04 nn.4 & 6 (1974). These
findings, as assessment criteria, can of course be challenged in a penalty proceeding where
the burden of proof is on the Secretary. But if the operator seeks review, he has the burden
of disproving the existence of an imminent danger, Lucas Coal Co., 1971-1973 OSHD
15,378, at 20,542, 20,544 (1972); that the inspector set an unreasonable time for abatement,
Freeman Coal Mining Corp., 1971-1973 OSHD 15,367, at 20,501, 20,509 (1970); and the
lack of unwarrantable failure or significant hazard, Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 3 CCH
EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE
18,706, at 22,599-600 (1974). The burden of proof in
administrative proceedings is set out in 43 C.F.R. § 4.587 (1973).
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104(a), (b) and (c). As a practical matter it is difficult to say that
any guidance has been provided. The Board has suggested that
there is no functional distinction between the use of a 104(a) order
or a 104(b) notice requiring prompt abatement where a significant
hazard is caused by a violation; and yet it has characterized a
significant hazard under section 104(c) and an imminent danger
under section 104(a) as being mutually exclusive,72 stating that a
significant hazard is something less than an imminent danger. Furthermore, the Board has refused to consider whether an inspector
has used the most appropriate enforcement vehicle.73
At least arguably it is possible to extract some guidelines from the
Board's decisions. The Board has stated that an imminent danger
exists where a reasonable man would concludie that an accident or
disaster was probable if normal mining operations continued prior
to or during abatement, where "normal mining operations" is defined as work designed to extract coal from the earth. 4Simply
stated, it seems that an imminent danger exists if a violation is
serious enough to require immediate abatement, and abatement can
be immediately achieved only by taking some miners from their
normal production activities. No consideration is to be given to the
likelihood of death or injury in the time required to abate or the
operator's willingness to abate.7 5 This determination by the Board
raises several challenges to its validity. First, it is questionable
whether such an interpretation is consistent with the statutory definition of imminent danger. In addition, the adoption of a normal
mining operations concept would seem to be unnecessary in view of
the other compliance-forcing tools provided in the Act.
Imminent danger is expressly defined in the Act as a condition
which is reasonably expected to cause death or serious injury before
it can be abated. This definition was broadened from that in the
Federal Coal Mine Safety Act of 195211 to include "any condition"
72. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUDE 18,706,
at 22,602 (1974).
73. One might even argue that the Board, in taking this position, has failed to fully
exercise the review authority intended by the Act.
74. Freeman Coal Mining Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE 16,567,
at 21,395 (1973).
75. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 1971-1973 OSHD 16,187, at 21,161-62 (1973).
76. Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 877, § 203(a)(1), 66 Stat. 694. A withdrawal order was
authorized when an inspector found that a "danger that a mine explosion, mine fire, mine
inundation, or man-trip or man-hoist accident [would] occur . . . immediately or before the
imminence of such danger [could] be eliminated."
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which could immediately cause death or injury.77 The emphasis in
the legislative history of the Act, however, remains on time, since
the history notes that delays in withdrawing the miners could be
fatal.78 Thus the Board's refusal to consider time for abatement visA-vis the likelihood of death or injury in that time is contrary to the
Act's definition and its legislative history.
The concept of normal mining operations has no statutory or
evidentiary origin.7" In view of the totally pervasive nature of the
mandatory standards,"° and the duty on the operator to maintain
compliance with them8 and to abate substandard conditions, 2 it is
unrealistic to define normal mining operations as only productionoriented activities. To the contrary, normal operations must inherently include maintenance of the mandatory standards and abatement of substandard conditions. The adoption of the normal mining
operations concept appears to be contrary to the general purpose of
the Act, 3 and its application in effect sanctions use of an imminent
danger withdrawal order when the same objective could be achieved
by a less intrusive notice under section 104(b).84 Thus, the concept
subverts the 104(b) notice to use only in situations where the danger
is remote or slight. This interpretation by the Board is unnecessary
in view of the provision in section 104(b) which allows for requiring
prompt abatement where a significant hazard exists. The Board's
inability to distinguish between an imminent danger and 104(b)
77. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 244. The intent was to broaden the scope of
imminent danger orders to encompass any possible conditions which could cause death,
rather than those conditions specifically enumerated in the 1952 Act.
78. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 89.
79. There is no reference to "normal mining operations" in the Act or its legislative
history, and no evidence was taken in Eastern or Freeman with regard to normal mining
practices.
80. The mandatory safety standards apply to everything from roof support systems and
methane monitoring to required porta-tiolets. See 30 C.F.R. § 75.100-.1730 (1973).
81. The Act placed primary responsibility on the operators to insure compliance with the
mandatory standards. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801(e), (g)(2) (1970).
82. Id. See also id. §§ 863 (d)-(f) (1970).
83. The obvious objective of the Act is to make working conditions in the coal mines safe.
To achieve this purpose, Congress placed the prime responsibility for safety on the operators
and miners, i.e., obtaining and maintaining safe working conditions must become part of the
normal mining operations. Id. §§ 801, 863(d)-(h) (1970).
84. For example, the safety objective of abating the condition resulting in the imminent
danger order in Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 1971-1973 OSHD 16,187, at 21,159 (1973),
discussed in note 51 supra, could readily have been obtained by issuing a § 104(b) notice (or
notices) and requiring immediate abatement.

1974

Comment

notice situation, therefore, can be traced to its overly broad interpretation of imminent danger. 5
The Board has further impeded the extraction of any meaningful
guidelines for the issuance of imminent danger orders by insisting
that each case must be determined on its own merits, and by adopting a subjective-objective reasonable man review standard, which
necessarily depends on an inspector's individual training and previous experience." Also, the Board's refusal to decide whether the
appropriate enforcement vehicle has been used, leaves the choice
entirely to the inspector's discretion. 7 Although the Board has provided guidelines for determining a reasonable time for abatement
under section 104(b), that determination remains completely within
the inspector's discretion. In addition, the Board adopted a reasonable man test for determining unwarrantable failure under section
104(c) and, as already noted, thereby further confused the definition
of imminent danger with its definition of significant hazard.
In summary, when an inspector finds a violation which creates a
serious hazard, he may choose his weapon-an imminent danger
order or a 104(b) notice (or a 104(c) notice or order if unwarrantable
failure is also found). In a pragmatic, though not administrative
sense, an order is final at the moment it is issued. The operator has
little choice but to take the action required by the inspector or suffer
substantial economic losses while waiting for a hearing and final
order by the Secretary; even if an expedited hearing is obtained,
there is no real remedy provided for an operator who has been mistakenly subjected to a closure. Thus, the enforcement tools of the
85. Shortly after the decisions in Eastern and Freeman, Senator Baker of Tennessee
proposed a bill to amend the Act, S. 2541, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). This proposed amendment would change the language of § 104(a) by inserting after the words "finds an imminent
danger," the phrase "as defined in § 3(j) of this Act." No action was taken on the proposal.
86. In fact this standard has not been applied without confusion. In Pocahontas Fuel Co.,
Docket No. HOPE 74-314, 7-8, 10 (1974), the Administrative Law Judge stated that Freeman
required both an objective and subjective standard of review. He found that applying the
subjective standard, the imminent danger order should be affirmed; but applying the objective standard, the order should be vacated. In Cowin & Co., Docket No. BARB 74-350, 7
(1974), the Administrative Law Judge held that Freeman required
The Judge . . . to look at the facts as they existed at the time of the issuance of the
order and to determine whether it was reasonable for the inspector involved to have
believed that death or serious injury could have resulted from the condition cited.
Id., citing U.S. Steel Corp., 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE T 17,551, at 21,999
(1974).
87. The instructions in the inspector's training manual, cited note 41 supra, probably tend
to render the inspector's judgment somewhat less than objective.
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Act, as construed by the Board, raise serious due process questions
which must be answered in light of the present status of due process
and governmental actions affecting private property rights.
DUE PROCESS AND

GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS AFFECTING PRIVATE
PROPERTY

While the Supreme Court has consistently refused to question the
substantive wisdom or reasonableness of economic regulations since
the New Deal era, 8 it has, with few exceptions, steadfastly upheld
the due process requirements of notice and a prior hearing with
respect to governmental action which deprives an individual of his
property rights. The leading recent Supreme Court decisions on this
issue have dealt with government seizures of private property as a
means of adjusting debtor-creditor relations. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 9
the Court held that the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes
violated due process by failing to provide for notice or a hearing
prior to seizure of the encumbered property. 0 Fuentes generally
requires notice and a hearing at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 1 To be meaningful, a hearing must be held at a time
88. Several c9mmentators have considered substantive due process a dead letter since the
New Deal era. See E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANs TODAY, § 328-30 (1973);
McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court:An Exhumation and Reburial,
1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34-62.
Deference to the validity of the state's exercise of its police powers in the interest of public
safety is typified by the Court's approach in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962), where it said that a state is justified in the exercise of its police powers so long as the
interests used are reasonably necessary to accomplish the public purpose without being
unduly oppressive. The Court had upheld an ordinance which deprived the owner of his
property's most beneficial use. Id. at 592-95.
89. 407 U.S. 67, reh. denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
90. The Florida statute authorized repossession of the sold goods without court order,
approval, or participation, since the writ of replevin was issued by the court clerk. The Court
found no requirement that the applicant even make a convincing showing before the seizure;
the applicant's bare assertion that he was entitled to a writ was sufficient. The buyer was
eventually afforded an opportunity for a hearing in a court action for repossession filed by
the seller. Id. at 73-75.
The Pennsylvania statute was essentially the same except that it never required an opportunity for a hearing on the merits, since the party seeking the writ was not required to
institute a court action for repossession. Id. at 77-78. See also Justice White's discussion of
these statutes in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895, 1904 (1974).
The Court held that these statutes worked a deprivation of property without due process
because they denied the right to a hearing before the chattels were repossessed from the
buyers. 407 U.S. at 96.
91. The lower courts and appellees had read Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969) (garnishment of wages without prior hearing held to violate due process), and Goldberg
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when the deprivation can still be prevented. 2 The Court commented that the length and severity of any deprivation is a factor
to weigh in determining the proper form of hearing, but it is not
determinative of the right to a prior hearing of some kind.13 There
are, however, "extraordinary situations" which justify seizure or
deprivation without notice or a prior hearing, if (1) the deprivation
is necessary to secure an important public or governmental interest,
(2) there is a need for prompt action, and (3) the government exercises strict control over the use of such power, i.e., the person initiating the deprivation is a responsible government official acting under
the guidelines of a narrowly drawn statute, and the action is necessary and justifiable under the circumstances."4
Applying a similar approach, the Court upheld the validity of the
Louisiana sequestration statute in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. 15 The
court distinguished Fuentes since strict controls were provided in
the Louisiana statute: the statute required a verified statement of
specific facts and a bond and authorization by a judge rather than
a court clerk, and it avoided issuance of the writ on the basis of an
ex parte determination of fault.9 Under the Act, however, the conv. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits without prior hearing held to
violate due process), as requiring a prior hearing only with respect to deprivation of such basic
necessities as wages or welfare benefits. The Fuentes Court, however, stated:
Both decisions were in the mainstream of past cases, having little or nothing to do with
the absolute "necessities" of life but establishing that due process requires an opportunity for a hearing before a deprivation of property takes effect [citations omitted].
In none of those cases did the Court hold that this most basic due process requirement
is limited to the protection of only a few types of property interests. While Sniadach
and Goldberg emphasized the special importance of wages and welfare benefits, they
did not convert that emphasis into a new and more limited constitutional doctrine.
407 U.S. at 88-89 (footnote omitted).
92. 407 U.S. at 80, citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1961).
93. 407 U.S. at 86. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), where the Court
emphasized that due process is flexible and that the procedural protectives required depend
on what the particular situation warrants. This determination depends on the nature of the
governmental function involved and the private interest affected thereby. The Court stated
"that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure."
Id. at 481.
94. 407 U.S. at 90-91. The Court noted that it had allowed summary seizures of property
to collect taxes, to meet national needs during war, to prevent the economic disaster of a bank
failure, and to protect the public from contaminated foods and mislabeled drugs. Id. at 92
nn.24-28.
95. 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
96. The statute allows a mortgage or lien holder to obtain a writ on his ex parte application without giving notice or an opportunity for a hearing to the debtor. A writ will issue only
when the creditor files a verified affidavit specifying the particular facts upon which he relies,
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cern is not specifically with due process and the government's interest in adjusting the debtor-creditor relationship, but with constitutional consequences of pre-notice, pre-hearing deprivations by government officials acting in accordance with statutes aimed at protecting the public health, safety, and welfare. The Supreme Court
has considered and rejected due process challenges to such actions
under public health statutes in Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry,
Inc.," and North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago." Presumafurnishes a bond, and obtains the authorization of a judge for the issuance based on the
affidavit. The debtor may immediately apply to have the writ dissolved, and it will be
dissolved unless the creditor proves the existence of the debt or lien and its delinquency. If
the creditor fails in his proof, the court may order the return of the property and award
damages, including attorney's fees. Id. at 1899-1900.
It was noted that Mitchell was not subjected to the unsupervised mercy of the court clerk
or the creditor. Id. at 1904. The Court also noted that the Pennsylvania and Florida statutes
had allowed for replevin only when the property was "wrongfully detained," and characterized this as a "broad 'fault' standard" which was considered to be unsatisfactory for preliminary ex parte determinations. Id. at 1905. The Court summarized the Louisiana statute as
protecting the "debtor's interest in every conceivable way, except allowing him to have the
property to start with ......
The "hardship to the debtor is limited . . . the process
proceeds under judicial supervision and management and the prevailing party is protected
against all loss." Id. at 1905-06. The Court added that its holding was limited to the constitutionality of the Louisiana statute. Id. at 1905 n.13.
Justice Powell, concurring, read the majority opinion as withdrawing significantly from the
broad sweep of Fuentes, which he read as requiring notice and a prior hearing in all cases,
and as, in effect, overruling Fuentes. At the same time, however, he emphasized that he found
the statutes in Fuentes violative of due process "because of their arbitrary and unreasonable
provisions." In his opinion, a determination of due process in any situation requires a consideration of the nature of the governmental function and the private interests affected. Here
he said that the government's function was to protect the interests of both debtors and
creditors, and that these interests had to be balanced. In accommodating both interests here
involved, Justice Powell stated that due process required: (1) that the creditor furnish adequate security and make a specific factual showing of probable cause to a neutral officer or
magistrate before sequestration; and (2) that an adversary proceeding must be provided
promptly after sequestration. Id. at 1908-09.
Justice Stewart, in his dissent, noted that the three bases on which the majority distinguished the present case from Fuentes had been expressly rejected as distinguishing factors
by the Fuentes Court, id. at 1912, but he concurred with the majority's return to a flexible
approach in determining procedural due process. Id. at 1910.
In summary, the Court found that the sequestration procedure: (1) fulfilled an important
public interest in protecting sellers, id. at 1900; (2) was appropriate because under Louisiana
law a seller's lien was extinguished if the buyer transferred possession, id. at 1900-01; and
(3) followed very narrowly drawn procedures, including a judicial authorization of the writ,
id. at 1904-05.
97. 339 U.S. 594, 595-98 (1950). Ewing, as administrator of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1) (1970), had seized Mytinger's vitamin pills and instituted
libel actions as provided by the statute. Mytinger, instead of waiting for the libel proceedings,
filed suit in federal district court to have the seizure provision of the statute declared uncon-
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bly the Fuentes Court's reference to these two cases was intended
to reaffirm their continued viability.9
In addition, a recent lower court decision has dealt with a summary seizure of private property under a statute designed to protect
the public safety. In Aircrane, Inc. v. Butterfield,' when plaintiff's
helicopter was seized to insure payment of a fine for a violation of
the helicopter's use certificate, Aircrane argued that summary seizure could be sustained only if all the elements of the Fuentes exception were present."0 ' The court rejected this assertion and, instead,
took a flexible approach similar to that used by the Mitchell Court.
It said, "ultimately what is involved is a balancing of the government's interest in summary action against the owner's interest in
adjudicating his rights prior to government action."''0 In upholding
the summary seizure, the Aircrane court weighed the governmental
interest in public safety against the resulting minimal deprivation
of Aircrane's property rights, even though the summary seizure
could not be classified as "necessary and justified."'" 3
stitutional. The statute provided that, where the administrator had probable cause to find
that an article was misbranded and dangerous to the public health or misleading to the
consuming public, he was authorized to seize the article and institute a libel proceeding.
98. 211 U.S. 306, 307-09 (1908). Public health officers of the city of Chicago, pursuant to
the municipal code, summarily seized and destroyed, as unfit for human consumption, food
stored by North American. North American sought to have the ordinance declared invalid
under the fourteenth amendment and to require that a judicial determination of the condition
of the food be made before seizure.
99. 407 U.S. at 92 nn.27-28.
100. 369 F. Supp. 598 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Aircrane's helicopter had been seized for an alleged
violation of a "compensation for hire" regulation. 49 U.S.C. § 1471(a)(1) (1970) provides a
maximum penalty of $1000 for a violation of any aircraft artification regulation and 49 U.S.C.
§ 1471(b) (1970) states that the aircraft involved in the violation "shall be subject to lien for
the penalty." The helicopter was seized while performing tasks not permitted under its
classification under the regulations. 369 F. Supp. at 605. The court noted that in United
States v. Vertol H21C, No. N8540, C-72-2101 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (slip opinion), the district
court in California had concluded that a seizure for a violation of the same regulation fell
within the Fuentes "extraordinary situation" exception. 369 F. Supp. at 605.
101. 369 F. Supp. at 604.
102. Id.
103. In deciding that the summary seizure squared with procedural due process, the court
said that it had to determine whether the procedure at issue furthered a governmental interest
of sufficient magnitude to justify dispensing with the usual procedural protections. It found
that the regulation violated was closely related to public safety and that the owner's interest
against summary seizure was minimal because (1) the deprivation would not significantly
impair Aircrane's adjudication of its rights (the court found this situation clearly distinguishable, as to its effect on the owner, from Goldberg and Sniadach), (2) the seizure was effective
only until Aircrane posted a minimal bond which insured payment of the penalty (Aircrane
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While Aircrane was decided merely by a district court, it nonetheless indicates a willingness by the courts to take a more liberal
approach to due process where the governmental interest is the
public health or safety rather than the adjustment of creditordebtor relations. The court in Aircrane, however, emphasized the
specific protections against mistaken seizure and the minimal effect
of the seizure on the property owner in that particular case. The
question, therefore, remains whether the summary procedures of the
Act can be justified under either the Fuentes-Mitchell or Aircrane
approaches.
Do

THE ORDER AND HEARING PROVISIONS OF THE ACT MEET THE
REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS?

There can be no question that a coal mine operator's interest in
his coal mine is entitled to the protections of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. The question remains what process is due,
i.e., what is the minimum procedure necessary to meet the requirements of due process? At the outset, the order provisions of the Act
are distinguishable from the seizure provisions approved of in
Ewing, where seizure was necessary for the institution of a libel
action;° 4 from those in A ircrane, where seizure of the mobile aircraft
could recover use of the helicopter by posting a bond of $2000 while the craft was worth over
$250,000; compare Fuentes, where the bond required was twice the value of the goods replevied), and (3) Aircrane had already fully informed the agency of the details of its operation,
thus significantly reducing the possibility of factual error which would be avoided by a public
hearing (Aircrane had filed all the details of its operation with the agency prior to the seizure).
Although the court noted that the situation did not present an emergency like that in North
American and that there was some question as to whether the statute was narrowly enough
drawn to prevent summary seizure except when "necessary and justified," it concluded that
the seizure could be upheld because the deprivation was minimal, there was adequate opportunity to present complete information to the agency before seizure, and there was an opportunity to contest the penalty claim in a subsequent court proceeding. Id. at 607-08 & n.9.
104. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1) (1970), relied on in Ewing,
provides:
Any article of food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded when
introduced into or while in interstate commerce or while held for sale (whether or not
the first sale) after shipment in interstate commerce, or which may not . . . be introduced into interstate commerce, shall be liable to be proceeded against while in interstate commerce, or any time thereafter, on libel of information and condemned in any
district court of the United States . . . within the jurisdiction of which the article is
found . . . (B) when the Secretary has probable cause to believe from facts found,
without hearing, by him or any officer or employee . . . that the labeling of the
misbranded article is fraudulent, or would be in a material respect misleading to the
injury or damage of the purchaser or consumer . . ..
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was permitted to insure payment of the fine; and from the provisions in North American, where the Court said that the owner could
bring an action for damages arising out of a wrongful seizure and
destruction.' 5 With the exception of North American, the seizures
occurred under statutes which established a blanket prohibition
against the use or distribution of the seized property until it had
been registered with or licensed by the appropriate agency; and thus
they resulted from an unlicensed use or a failure to comply with the
registration standards. Since the purposes and/or procedures for
seizure in these cases are conceptually different from those in the
Act, they cannot be taken to establish blanket exceptions to the
requirements of due process in every instance where the public
health or safety is to be protected. Their value as guideposts for a
due process analysis of the order-hearing provisions of the Act must,
therefore, be considered in view of the purposes and procedures
provided in the governing statute.
Since the Act does not provide for a pre-order hearing, it must be
determined whether the three-pronged exception to Fuentes applies
to validate summary deprivations of property as provided therein.
The first element of the test would seem to be satisfied since protecting the lives of coal miners is clearly an appropriate subject for
an exercise of police power. In addition, the need for prompt action
is similarly met, even absent the finding of imminent danger."' In
21 U.S.C. § 334(b) (1970) states that the seizure pursuant to the libel shall conform, as nearly
as possible, to the procedure in admiralty. Libel in admiralty means to seize under process
at the commencement of a suit. Its purpose is to secure payment of the fine or penalty. 28
U.S.C. §§ 2461(a), (b) (1970). The deprivation of property allowed under the Act is not for
the purpose of instituting suit or to secure payment of the penalty. Ewing was distinguished
in a similar fashion by the court in Nor-Am Agricultural Prod. Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1133,
1139-40 (7th Cir.), rev'd en banc 435 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 935
(1971).
105. In North American, the Court said that the health officer's ex parte finding was not
binding on the owner and that the owner had a right to a hearing after destruction of the
food. Such an action, it said, would be at common law for damages against the official. 211
U.S. at 316, citing, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). Under the Act, the government and the inspectors would be protected from such actions by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. See note 47 supra.
106. In Ewing, the court said that "a requirement for a hearing . . . does not arise
merely because the danger of injury may be more apparent or immediate in the one case than
in the other." Such a determination is for Congress to make. 339 U.S. at 600. At the same
time the Court emphasized that a hearing was required before the final administrative order
becomes effective. Id. at 599. The problems with the orders provided by the Act is that they
are effective and, in a pragmatic sense, final when issued. In Nor-Am Agricultrual Prod. Inc.
v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1133, 1140-41, (7th Cir. 1970), the court viewed an imminent danger order
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fact, it is doubtful that any statute protecting the public health,
safety or welfare would fail to meet these first two elements, even
where individual property rights are affected. The real issue becomes whether the third element of the test is satisfied applying the
flexible or balancing approach used in Mitchell and Aircrane, i.e.,
how should the balance be struck between the governmental interest in summary closure and the operator's interest in determining
his rights prior to closure.
The governmental interest in summary seizure under the Act is
the protection of the coal miners. At the same time, the government
has a strong interest in increasing coal production as the need for
this vital energy resource increases. The operator has a twofold interest in a pre-order determination of his rights. First, he wants to
avoid mistaken or unwarranted interferences with the use of his
property, since he has no real remedy when an order is mistakenly
issued. In addition, he wishes to avoid payment of compensation to
miners for idle time caused by an order, since he is liable for these
payments even if the order is subsequently vacated.
Simply stated, the issue is whether the Act is drawn narrowly
enough, and the administrative guidelines are sufficiently strict, to
insure that an order is issued only when "necessary and justified."
The language of sections 104(a)-(c) and the definition of imminent
danger are very broad and general. The Act leaves the determination of "imminent danger," a "reasonable time for abatement,"
"unwarrantable failures" and "significant hazard" completely
within the inspector's discretion. The administrative interpretations have similarly provided broad and general guidelines, and at
least arguably, have broadened even further the definition of imminent danger. In fact, these interpretations have made the practical distinction between an imminent danger, significant hazard and
non-imminent danger, impossible. In addition, section 104(b) and
(c) orders require an ex parte determination of fault by the inspector, and no real remedy has been provided for an operator who has
been wrongfully subjected to such an order. Clearly, the strict controls required under Fuentes and Mitchell are lacking.
Where the government's interest in the safety of the miners is
strong, the question under the less strict balancing approach of
as final in a pragmatic sense even though administrative review leading to a final administrative order was still available. Cf., id. at 1156-57.
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Aircrane becomes whether an order causes only a "minimal interference" with the operator's property which is outweighed by achievement of the strong public interest in safety. In Aircrane, the seizure
did not affect the adjudication of the penalty, the payment of which
the seizure was designed to secure. Similarly, where an order is
issued under the Act, its issuance does not directly affect the adjudication of the penalty to be assessed for a violation. However, the
issue in a review proceeding is the validity of the order itself, and
an operator cannot effectively and meaningfully litigate that issue
in a post-order hearing. The operator cannot post a bond and resume operations; instead, he must comply with the inspector's demands or suffer substantial economic losses while waiting for a hearing and decision. °7 The operator is also denied a pre-order opportunity to submit his version of the facts to the agency. Applying the less
strict balancing approach of Aircrane, then, it is apparent that the
balance should not always tip in favor of the government's interests
if we also consider the procedural methods involved. If the choice is
couched in terms of pure interests, the government's concern with
the safety of miners' lives will concededly win out over any property
interests of the operators; but the choice should also balance the
means used to effectuate such interests. When we look realistically
at the loosely drawn procedures of the Act, it becomes clear that the
operators' property interests are often substantially impaired by the
achievement of a governmental end which could readily be obtained
in a less offensive manner. In effect, the economic losses caused by
mistakenly issued orders have been forced on the operators as a cost
08
of providing safe working conditions for their miners.
In order to achieve the desired level of safety enforcement and
meet the procedural requirements of due process, some changes in
the present procedures are required. Since the issuance of an order
causes more than a "minimal interference" with the operator's
property, controls should be developed to insure that an order is
107. The effect of an order on an operator will obviously vary with the extent of the mine
closing, the duration of the order, and the size of the operator's business. The Act, however,
applies to all mines from which products enter or affect interstate commerce (essentially all
mines), 30 U.S.C. § 803 (1970), including mines employing anywhere from three or four to
over a thousand miners. While the effect of an order on a large operator may be minimal in
an economic sense, an order closing a small mine is greatly akin to the summary garnishment
of wages which was prohibited in Sniadach.
108. The court in Lucas v. Morton, 358 F. Supp. 900, 903 (W.D. Pa. 1973), said that such
a situation would constitute a "deprival of due process."
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issued only where necessary and justified. A narrowly defined interpretation of imminent danger, where time to abate is a vital consideration, would justify a pre-hearing order, provided an immediate
post-order hearing of some kind were made available.10 1
Section 104(b) and (c) orders, however, stand on a different footing. They primarily serve a punitive function while at the same time
advancing the safety purposes of the Act. The Act requires the
finding of an alleged violation which will eventually lead to a civil
penalty assessment proceeding. An order will issue if an inspector
makes an ex parte determination of bad faith in abating the violation (104(b)) or wilful neglect of a significant hazard (104(c)). In the
penalty proceeding, however, the burden is on the prosecution to
prove bad faith or wilful neglect even though a 104(b) or (c) order
has been issued for the alleged violation."' There is no practical way
to obtain control over the inspector's ex parte determination of fault
as the basis of 104(b) or (c) orders. If such order provisions are an
indispensible part of an effective enforcement scheme, some form of
prior hearing must be provided."'
SUMMARY

At the outset the question was asked: Does due process apply in
109. Compare, for example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 662(a)
(1970) [hereinafter cited as OSHA], which requires the Secretary of Labor to obtain an
imminent danger order from a federal district court, with the similar provision in the
Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2061 (1973 Supp.). The legislative history of
OSHA emphasized that time in taking necessary action was essential. In considering the
imminent danger provision, Congress rejected a proposal which would have allowed an OSHA
inspector to take discretionary action when an immediate danger was found. It rejected
discretionary action even where the danger was too imminent to obtain a court order and even
though the inspector would have had to obtain the concurrence of a regional Labor Department official over the telephone and an informal review of the order would have been required.
3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 5189-90, 5221 (1970).

110. See, e.g., Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., 3 CCH
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18,901, at 22,707 (1974) where MESA failed to sustain its burden of proving unwarrantable
failure in a penalty proceeding even though a § 104(c) order had been issued. The Board,
however, reversed the administrative law judge's refusal to assess a penalty, stating that the
evidence supported the finding of a violation. Presumably since the order had not been
contested and vacated in a penalty proceeding, the operator would not have been allowed an
offset for the economic loss caused by the order. The Board also said that the order could
not be vacated in the penalty proceeding.
111. Under OSHA a time is set for abatement of a violation of the mandatory standards,
and failure to abate in the time set subjects the employer to an additional civil penalty for
each day that the violation remains unabated. 29 U.S.C. §§ 659(a)-(c), 666(d) (1970).
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the coal fields? The question is not easily resolved. The Act was
adopted with the aim of reducing the overwhelming number of jobrelated deaths and disabling injuries in the nation's most hazardous
occupation. The enforcement provisions that were adopted are
strong, swift and efficient; but they also, when exercised, summarily
deprive the coal mine operator of the only known beneficial use of
his property. One might readily dismiss such temporary interferences with the operator's property as merely an added cost in the
production of coal. However, the issue is really not whether Congress could take away the right to mine when, for example, an
imminent danger exists, because clearly in the interest of public
safety, it can. A problem arises because the procedures adopted in
exercising that legitimate authority are so loosely drawn. Under the
Act, the determination that a mine should be temporarily closed is
left completely to an inspector's unguided or misguided discretion.
The operator is eventually afforded an opportunity for a hearing.,
but the quickest way an operator can get an order terminated is to
do whatever the inspector deems appropriate. If the order is subsequently vacated because of a mistake of fact or judgment by the
inspector, the operator obtains no real relief and is afforded no real
remedy for the economic losses he has suffered. The question, therefore, is whether Congress can consider the public interest in protecting the lives of the miners to be so important, and the operator's
interest in avoiding summary closure of his mine, so minimal, that
the requirements of procedural due process can be met by providing
the operator with an eventual and basically meaningless post-order
opportunity for a hearing. Indeed, one might ask whether, in the
area of economic safety regulation, procedural due process is a viable concept at all. If the answer is "yes", one could hardly say that
due process does exist in the coal fields. Admittedly, the hazardous
nature of the coal industry requires strong enforcement authority,
but if we are to retain any semblance of procedural due process in
the coal industry, that authority must be more controlled and operators must be afforded an opportunity for a hearing at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner. In view of the Court's approach
in Mitchell and Fuentes, even when less strictly applied as in
Aircrane, the procedures provided in the Act fail to strike an acceptable balance between the government's interest in summary action
and the operator's interest in a pre-order determination of his rights.
Unless the Court is prepared to give total deference to the legislative
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determination of acceptable procedures in the area of safety regulations as it has given almost total deference to the legislative determination on substantive due process questions in the area of economic regulation, the order and hearing provisions of the Act cannot
pass muster under the due process clause.
DANIEL

M. DARRAGH

